Why are we so divided? On the one hand, feminists insist that the personal is political, relating how personal experiences are inextricably connected with the greater social and historical context, and therefore demand a reform of rigid traditional interpretations. On the other hand, traditionalists defend culture and tradition as the foundation of identity, the last bastion of family, and a necessary social order to retain social cohesion, and a morally upright community. Moreover, modern discursive practices involving hermeneutical gymnastics feed the rationalist delusion and have only derailed us from apprehending the human being behind which these processes are founded upon, reducing polemic prowess to an exercise in vanity.
To understand why people are so divided by moral issues such as gender, we must examine the way relational trauma, through rigid notions of masculinity, impact self-development and inform an individual’s moral orientation. Using developmental psychology with a special interest in moral philosophy, the author aims to invite the reader towards moral advancement and relational commitment by highlighting the parallels between relational disconnection and communal division. By moving towards relational maturity and self-integration, we can advocate for better solutions to aid the gender debate that incorporate old wisdoms of inviting one another towards interdependence while cultivating inner peace.
Part I: Relational Trauma
Traditional gender socialization processes inform men and women of their specified roles and duties by which they can ground their sense of self, meaning, and purpose (Ruether, 1983). However, a rigid adherence to cultural norms and gender roles limits the expression of humanity through the subjugation of an individual’s intuitive sense and requires an acceptance of fate with a sense of duty and absolute subservience. Such pressure to maintain a strict social order necessitates a disconnection from parts of the self and promotes psychological disorder. Rather than gender roles serving as a unifying, divinely-ordained system of nurturance, rigid interpretations often manifest as a self-constructed narcissistic enterprise fostering disconnection and division within the self, family, and community. This section examines the role of rigid interpretations of masculinity in conceiving relational disconnection through a mother and father wound, and how a new involved father can be a source of healing for all.
Relational Disconnection
In modern androcentric cultures, a man’s status is defined by his intellectual prowess, his ability to dampen his emotions, and his capacity to handle intense pressure and evade vulnerability. Terrence Real, a renowned feminist family therapist writes in his book I Don’t Want To Talk About It that the trauma inherent within the traditional socialization of boys can be grouped into three domains: disconnection to the mother, disconnection to aspects of the self, and disconnection to others (Real, 2003). Taken together, these severances comprise of a loss of intimacy and a loss of relational intelligence.
Mother Wound
The earliest disconnection occurs with the mother. The idea that boys must rupture an emasculating connection to their mothers is one of the oldest, least questioned, and most deeply rooted myths of patriarchy (Real, 2003). For generations, it was taught that a boy must be helped to detach from his enmeshing mother, oftentimes through violent rituals, and sever his “psychological umbilical cord” (Real, 2003). The assumption was that women in general and mothers, in particular, can “feminize” a male, robbing him of his masculinity. Women in these families hold no power of protection from the father‘s considerable (and sometimes unlimited) authority. She is taught to allow the unceremonious beatings in the name of discipline and respect for authority. If she dares to shield her child or show compassion, she is subjugated to the same violence. This surrender creates the wound of rejection and emotional abandonment. As a result, the boy grows up to reject his mother’s authority perceiving her as “too weak”, she shrinks from the full exercise of her parental rights, and in doing so, both play out the values of patriarchy (Real, 2003). Real maintains that these boys suffer less from their absent fathers than they suffer from the overwhelmed mothers they must live with, mothers that they have bullied into silence much to their own detriment (Real, 2003).
Within traditional gender roles, a “good mother” was one who remained passive by ignoring her maternal nurturing instincts, actively worked towards creating her complementary opposite, thereby facilitating the son’s move into the male domain (Walters et al., 1988). Therefore, the mother wound is not the stereotypical wound of the mother who will not let go, but the wound of the mother who, in compliance with society’s fears and rules, lets go too early. The traditional idea that only men know how to raise sons undermines not only a mother’s instinct to care but also her capacity to guide and set limits (Real, 2003).
As devastating as the disconnection from the mother is, the instruction to turn away is not only from the mother, but from intimacy itself, and from cultivating or even grasping the values and skills that sustain a deep emotional connection. The diminished attachment to the mother is a particular manifestation of the disavowal of all things feminine, including many of the most emotionally rich parts of the self. Individuals who grow up rejecting their humanity and escaping vulnerability, seek to disconnect from this part of themselves, and in doing so reject the very ingredient for close companionship and relational intimacy. Real argues, that traditional visions of masculinity leave men to experience more childish forms of closeness, and in order to have sustained healthy relationships, these need to be replaced with more adult forms of closeness which can only happen through healing primary attachment wounds (2003). Therefore, it can be implied, that mother wounds manifest as a rejection of emotional expression, nurturance, compassion, and relational intimacy.
Father Wound
Father wounds are realized through a father’s physical or emotional absence and may manifest as disguised forms of accepting or rejecting fatherly traits (protection, authority). Levant suggests that father wounds are so pervasive that they are a ‘normative developmental trauma’ (1996). A strong adherence to the traditional masculine role has been found to be at the core of father wounds (Kimmel, 2007). There is much evidence to showcase the negative effects of absent fathers on men and society including low self-esteem, struggle to establish intimate relationships, development deficits, and a greater risk of engaging in antisocial or violent behavior (Miller, 2013). The CDC generally views child abuse as an act of commission whereas child neglect, including emotional neglect, is an act of omission where there is a failure to meet the key needs of the child (Miller, 2013). If one were to accept this operational definition, then the father wound should be viewed as a form of psychological abuse. A psychic injury that can be likened to a physical wound in need of healing.
A New Involved Father
Real believes that once we realize that the elusive “masculine identity” does not exist inside the boy’s psyche, but rather that it is a social construct to which the boy must bend and comply, we can understand why it is impossible for most boys to feel secure about it (2003). He further contends that boys who fare poorly in their psychological adjustment are those with abusive or neglectful fathers, while boys who are the most well-adjusted have warm, loving fathers, who score high in precisely “feminine” qualities (Real, 2003). Morman and Floyd (2002) have found that the culture of the detached authoritarian father is giving way to the role of a more involved, nurturing father, and with this changing role, men may feel more at ease to abandon rigid definitions of masculinity. Consistent with this perspective, psychological androgyny has long been associated with many great psychological benefits, including successful coping skills, for men and women alike (Cheng, 2005).
In summary, relational disconnection serves as the basis for an underdeveloped and disintegrated self. With only access to parts of ourselves, it comes as no surprise as to why our communities reflect the same level of disintegration. The next section examines contemporary models that conceptualize a cognitively mature and integrated self.
Part II: Self Development Theories
The Integrated Self
All major world religions have cultivated inner peace through values that facilitate a balance between internal states. Religious development can therefore be understood as a process of ongoing self-realization in which a person strives for a unified wholeness (Pranger, 1974). By this definition, personhood only becomes realized when the different facets of a person are mutually coordinated such that the whole represents more than the sum of its parts. Both early psychoanalysts and modern neuropsychologists understood this, and maintained that fully-functioning persons engage in a life-long process of unifying opposing parts of the psyche into the self (Jung, 1967), characterized by a unity in thought, emotion, and action that amounts to “being someone” or having “an integrated self” (Kuhl et al., 2015). An immature self has been found to contain a hyper-rational “analytic ego” with no direct access to emotion and somatic states. Self-conceptions are based on others’ expectations that may be perceived as duty and obligation, and low-level forms of intuition that lead to stereotyping (Kuhl et al., 2015). In contrast, an integrated self is characterized by an extensive connection to implicit emotion and bodily perception, attentional vigilance (self-related surveillance), greater “response-ability” (feeling the effects of negative consequences), the ability to integrate negative experiences, an extended unconscious (paradoxical intentions), resilient coping, an extended sense of trust, and a temporal connectedness with the past (in a meaning-providing way) and the future (Kuhl et al., 2015).
Cognitive and Ethical Self Development
One of the most empirically based theories of cognitive and ethical development originated with William Perry (1970), who noted that as an individual matured, cognition tended to shift from dualism (absolute, black and white, right and wrong type of thinking) to multiplicity (recognizing that some problems are solvable and some answers are not yet known) to relativism (understanding the importance of the specific context of knowledge, as relative to other factors), and finally to commitment (accepting uncertainty, belief in personal values, respect for others, and curiosity) (For stages of Perry’s scheme, see Appendix A).
Perry’s research revealed that while humans initially think in terms of dichotomies or absolute terms with no middle ground; with greater education, experience, and maturity, we begin to recognize partial right and wrong in each position. Some researchers have found that some adults may move beyond relativism into dialectical thinking, one of the most advanced aspects of post-formal thinking (Basseches, 1984), which allows a person to synthesize and reconcile between conflicting viewpoints, embrace ambiguity, and find new perspectives. Other studies have confirmed this theory, stating that a ‘paradox mindset’ has the ability to foster innovation, creative problem solving, greater life satisfaction (Liu et al., 2020), as well as greater self-control and self-congruent action (Kuhl et al., 2015).
Therefore, humans can be nurtured towards higher developmental states that involve integrating opposing viewpoints and enabling full-spectrum thinking that facilitates a greater acceptance of new perspectives.
Part III: Moral Development
Nativism vs Empiricism
One of the longest-standing debates within moral philosophy is between the role of reason and intuition in the search for moral truth. Enlightenment thinkers were united in rejecting divine revelation as the source of moral knowledge but divided as to whether morality is primarily learned through nurture and the faculties of reason (empiricism) or innately and intuitively as part of human nature as a result of evolution (nativism) (Haidt, 2012). Empiricists including Plato, Kant, and Kohlberg believed that the ability to reason well about ethical issues caused good behavior. Whereas, nativists like Hume, believed that moral reasoning is, in fact, a servant of moral intuitions (Hume). Hume’s view was at the time unpopular and challenged the rationalist approach that has dominated moral psychology in Western societies.
Until recently, prominent theories in moral psychology conceived the moral domain as a set of norms and regulations about how individuals should treat other individuals; theorists generally focused on concepts of harm, rights, and justice (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983), or care and compassion (Gilligan, 1982; Hoffman, 1982). However, Shweder (2008) proposed that this conception of morality reflected the distinctly individualistic conception of the self held widely in secular Western contexts. Based on his fieldwork in India, Shweder proposed that moral psychology has failed to address much, and perhaps even most, of the moral domain that would result from a global survey of societies. People in all cultures have moral and regulatory concepts related to harm, rights, and justice (which he called the “ethic of autonomy”). However, in many collectivistic cultures, one also finds a concept of the self as part of a social system, related to a set of moral and regulatory concepts such as loyalty and duty (which he called the “ethic of community”), as well as conceptions of the self as a vessel for a divine soul, with moral regulatory notions that preserve one’s purity and sanctity (which he called “the ethic of divinity”). Ultimately, Shweder’s pluralistic conception of the moral domain gave rise to modern modified nativist views that respect the depth and importance of cultural variation within moral behavior.
Moral Pluralism & Moral Foundations Theory
Moral pluralism is based on nativist claims that morality is organized prior to experience, in other words — intuitively (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), and that morality is rich, complex, multifaceted, and internally contradictory (Haidt, 2012). On the other hand, moral monism, or the attempt to ground all of morality to a single or binary moral modalities such as care/harm or justice/fairness, leads to societies that risk becoming inhumane out of the failure to integrate multiple moral principles (Haidt, 2012). To this end, Haidt and colleagues developed a Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), encompassing six moral foundations that challenge the moral domains found within secular Western perspectives. MFT has been used particularly to understand political differences and to critique left-leaning parties while helping them to appreciate the foundations of conservative morality. It must be noted, however, that MFT is not a normative theory of the concerns people should have, rather it is a descriptive theory of the moral concerns that people do have within the United States (Graham, 2014).
Liberals & Conservatives
According to MFT, moralities found within social liberals tend to rest most strongly on the care/harm, fairness/cheating, and liberty/oppression foundations which support the liberal ideals of caring for victims, social justice and solidarity, and fighting the oppression of bullying and domineering elites such as alpha males. However, when it comes to the three binding foundations of authority/subversion, loyalty/betrayal, and sanctity/degradation, not only do the socially liberal fail to resonate, they actively reject these concerns as immoral (Haidt, 2012) (For liberal and conservative moral matrices, see Appendix B). They believe that loyalty to a group is the basis of racism and exclusion, authority is oppression and abuse, and sanctity functions to suppress female sexuality and justify homophobia.
The socially and morally conservative, on the other hand, utilize all six moral foundations and believe that a morally upright society requires external constraints including laws, institutions, customs, traditions, nations, and religions; without these, they believe people will begin to cheat and behave selfishly, and social capital would rapidly decay. Haidt (2012) adds that though conservatives also value care and harm, they are more willing than liberals to sacrifice care and let some people get hurt in order to achieve their many other moral objectives. Conservatives have been found to care more about moral issues related to loyalty (ex. patriotism and nationalism), authority (ex. law and order, respect for parents and police), and purity (ex. religious and traditional restrictions on sexuality and drug use, and moral decay) (Haidt, 2012). While social conservatives do a better job at preserving moral capital, they often fail to notice certain classes of victims, fail to limit the predations of certain powerful interests, and fail to see the need to change or update institutions as times change (Haidt, 2012).
Moral Perception
While MFT embraces multiplicity in its approach towards understanding a broader moral domain, critics have argued that social relations need to be examined within a given context in order to understand the dominant moral motivations at play (unity, hierarchy, equality, proportionality) (Fiske, 2011). For example, whereas one person may see being compassionate and helpful as central to his or her moral identity, another person may emphasize being fair and just, and yet another being loyal, dutiful, and self-sacrificing. Perhaps a commitment to relative contexts would further MFT as a multidimensional approach.
Earlier moral theorists like Gilligan understood that from a developmental perspective, both inequality (fairness) and attachment are universal human experiences: all children are born into a situation of inequality, and because everyone has been vulnerable to both oppression and abandonment, two moral visions — one of justice and one of care — recur in human experience (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). She believed that mature moral thinking required a regulation between opposing moral concerns (ex. care and justice), as well as an ability to hold them simultaneously (1988). Gilligan advocated that each individual needs to identify where the self stands with respect to the two moral orientations and ask questions such as: “Is there another way to think about this problem?”, and “What is at stake for me in the conflict?” (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). Gilligan believed that having a distinctive moral orientation, whether implicit or explicit, may indicate a preferred way of seeing, and that preference needs to be explored. Approaching moral development in terms of moral orientation has the potential to transform debates over sex differences into serious questions about moral perspectives and possible errors in moral perception (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988).
Religion as a Function of a Moral Self & Community
It is important to note that even within secular approaches, religion has come to be respected for the value it brings towards social cohesion and self-integration. Haidt, Shweder, and others who were influenced by Eastern approaches understood that religion exists primarily for people to achieve together what they cannot achieve on their own, and serves as a center of gravity that brings people together (Haidt, 2012). Haidt concludes that liberalism, which has done much to bring about freedom and equal opportunity, is not sufficient as a governing philosophy; it tends to overreach, change things too quickly, and reduces the stock of moral capital (Haidt, 2012). Bertrand Russell writes:
“Social cohesion is a necessity, and mankind has never yet succeeded in enforcing cohesion by merely rational arguments. Every community is exposed to two opposite dangers; ossification through too much discipline and reverence for tradition, on one hand; on the other hand, dissolution or subjection to foreign conquest, through the growth of an individualism and personal independence that makes cooperation impossible.” (Bertrand Russell)
Therefore, when liberals or conservatives overemphasize the importance of certain moral foundations over others, they restrict the moral matrices that render social cohesion. Religion works on both levels (individual and collective) of our nature to suppress selfishness, or at least to channel it in ways that pays dividends for the group (Haidt, 2012). Within a religious community, following a set of norms, roles, and institutions weigh on the emotions (intuition) to influence behavior. However, atheists living in loose communities with a less binding matrix may have to rely on an internal moral compass, read by the rational self (Haidt, 2012).
To summarize, adopting a multidimensional moral matrix by means of religion, can foster a much-needed individual and collective integration. Both liberals and conservatives can broaden their moral domains and find creative solutions that serve and simultaneously balance opposing viewpoints. For example, liberals, in addition to their initiatives, can find ways to advocate for more responsible authority, greater loyalty for family and community, and a greater sanctity for marriage and the human body. Likewise, conservatives can work towards better care for victims, offer greater flexibility for the definitions of authority and masculinity, advocate for equitable relations between spouses, and actively serve justice to those who behave selfishly.
Part IV: Crisis of Islamic Masculinity
Beyond Rigid Notions of Masculinity
Amanaullah De Sondy writes in Crisis of Islamic Masculinity that “rigid notions of masculinity are causing crisis in the global Islamic community” which, caused by colonialism and regional instability, have led many Muslims to turn to “theocratic Islamisms” (De Sondy, 2015). He observes that while strict gender roles, familial dominance, shows of power, subordination of non-heterosexuals, and even militarism are idealized for men, in practice, Muslim men express masculinity in many different ways; and that men who do not find these narrow definitions of masculinity relevant to their lives are often pushed towards secularism (as are Muslim women, for the same reasons) (Inloes, 2014). De Sondy observes that both God and women are frequently used as foils for defining masculinity, and serve to restrict or oppress women. He adds that the highly personal relationship between humans and God does not lend itself to the organization of society, because that relationship cannot be typified and replicated (De Sondy, 2015).
Ultimately, De Sondy does not aim to uncover one specific definition of true Islamic masculinity, but rather, he explores the different ways in which Muslims have understood masculinity through an examination of the Qur’an and writings of Indian and Pakistani authors and scholars. The selection of India and Pakistan is, in part, to challenge the dominant image of the Muslim man as Arab or Middle Eastern. Regarding the Qur’an, he writes that the Qur’an is inconclusive with respect to uncovering a single definition of masculinity, since many Qur’anic male figures, such as Prophets Adam, Eesa, Yusuf, and Muhammad (S), lived significantly different lives (Inloes, 2014).
In his view, the Qur’an commands self-reflexivity and an individual examination of power within our own social roles (Inloes, 2014). He sympathizes with Muslim feminist scholars engaged in Islamic exegesis who are insiders to Islam, not critics, Western Feminists, nor Orientalists, whom he believes are faced with challenging the traditional interpretations from within a faithfully religious framework, and therefore, must walk a thin line as they consistently attempt to “demonstrate that they can be both pro-family and in support of women’s agency, both critical of masculinity and submissive to God” (De Sondy, 2015). Though much of the Islamic heritage through tafsir literature is run by a gamut of strict gender roles, De Sondy emphasizes his findings of varied views from within the Islamic tradition and their relevance to Muslims today (Inloes, 2014).
Part V: Towards Integration
Relational trauma through ruptured attachment with the mother and father is inevitable when socialization is based upon rigid gender roles. The early psychological disconnection from the intuitive-emotional self (trauma-trapped region) inhibits the development of a fully-functioning matured integrated self. Without treatment or self-reflection, these traumas can be rationalized and polarize us towards certain moral orientations. By overemphasizing or devaluing either side of the moral matrix we threaten overall social cohesion. The highest levels of cognitive, relational, and moral maturity offer paradoxical, ambiguous, and creatively nuanced approaches and solutions. Therefore growth and careful introspection are necessary pre-requisites towards a more holistic understanding of the gender debate.
Humans Before Muslims
We are all humans before Muslims who are on a continuous journey towards maturation and integration. We can either choose to deny our vulnerabilities or choose to embrace them and commit to growth. When we do not actively move towards growth, we face tests, hardships, and mental disorder. At each level in the growth process, we will extract different lessons, morals, and wisdoms from the sacred texts. That is the universality and timelessness of the Qur’an. Our religion was revealed to our Prophet (S) in stages, in which he and his followers went through mass cognitive, social, emotional, and moral development. As he emigrated from Makkah to Madinah, the revealed verses became more refined and specific to personal development and relational intelligence. As we Muslims integrate and balance our rational and intuitive sides, learning to consciously borrow from one another, we expand the human experience to remove dualistic “either—or” solutions in favor of paradoxical “both—and” solutions. Oftentimes we miss the point in gender debates when we allow our hyper-rationalist and analytic minds to lead the search to objective truth. Instead, we can approach with curiosity, vulnerability, and empathy, and through that care, we can validate injustices and nurture each other into individuals who are integrated with both heart and mind.
Possible Areas of Exploration
Traditional and feminist Islamic scholars alike require an ongoing conversation about how to continue to derive meaning from the past. While a matured understanding may reveal relativistic and paradoxical solutions, thinkers must refrain from skipping the process (without experiential integration) to derive solutions “as the context demands” (Barlas, 2016). Furthermore, while academic spheres are potent environments promoting innovative hermeneutical solutions, individuals may overemphasize hyper-intellectual analysis, and minimize the role of felt and embodied human experiences. On the other hand, overemphasizing and leading with intuition and emotion can have the effect of further disintegrating our communities, and spawn a new narcissism. Lastly, by allowing the minority to criticize dominant traditions, one begins to discover lost principles. The potential of valuing feminist perspectives is in aiding us to reveal a shared humanity and integrating them to form a new morally mature relationship.
Conclusion
Restoring balance requires us to be willing to integrate opposing perspectives, embrace ambiguity, continuously search for deeper truths, allow ourselves to sit with discomfort, and consciously choose to connect despite our differences. Like the ancient Chinese yin-yang symbol, even contrasting or seemingly opposing forces are in fact complementary and interdependent. Each side is partially right and partially wrong. These opposing forces are not enemies, rather, each side provides value and a moral counterbalancing system. We need both in order to shift or alternate the balance. Instead of fighting our opposite, we can be encouraged to embrace paradox and learn from our opposite. Happiness comes from between (not within), it comes from sharing our wounds with others and working together to heal. Rather than dismissing each other’s moral concerns, we can be curiously connected and help each other fulfill our prescribed roles with the understanding that only through the remembrance and adherence of Allah’s ﷻ commandments do hearts (and minds) find rest.
Appendix A
Appendix B
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